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I. A Case Study: The Platte River




1. Nebraska Nongame and Endangered
Species Act, SS 37-430, et seq.,
Neb. R.R.S. (Supp. 1975)
2. Little Blue Case
Little Blue NRD v. Lower Platte 
North, 206 Neb. 535 (1980)
Little Blue NRD v. Lower Platte 
North, 210 Neb. 862 (1982)
3. Neb. Const. Article XV, S 6
4. L.B. 252, § 46-235 Neb. R.R.S.
(Supp. 1981)
II. A Model for Conflict Resolution
A. Pooling Data




LITTLE BLUE N.R.D. v. LOWER PLATTE NORTH N.R.D.
Neb., 317 N.W.2d 726
• Heard before ICRIVOSHA, C. Le and
B4SLAUGH,  AlcCOVT14, cubrrox,
BRoDgEr, WHITS; end HASTINGS.
KRIV06111, Cada Justice.	 pacable, its provisions were satisfied, we
The appellants, who are various Nebraska
municipalities, natural resources districts, a
conservation district, and several environ-
mental organizations, have appealed from
an order entered by the director of the
Department of Water Resources (Depart-
ment) which in substance granted to the
appellee, Little Blue Natural Resources Dis-
trict (Little Blue), the authority to appro-
priate, under conditions prescribed in the
order, waters of the North Platte River for
a proposed irrigation project to be con-
structed by Little Blue. For reasons which
we will set out in greater detail, We find
that we must reverse the order of the De-
partment's director and remand the matter
back to the director for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
This is the second appearance of this mat-
ter before this court. The facts are fully
set out in our first opinion at 21:18 Neb. 585,
294 N.W2d 598 (1980) (Little Blue I), and
will not be repeated herein. The effect of
ow order in Little Blue I was to require the
director to determine whether the taking of
the water contemplated by Little Blue for
its proposed project should be denied be-
muse such denial was demanded by the
public interest, as requited by Neb.Const
art. XV, § 6. Following our decision in
Little Blue I, the director instructed all the
interested parties to prepare and submit
briefs to him addressing only the issue of
"public interest" as it pertains to the pro-
posal of Little Blue. No further hearings
were held by the director and no further
testimony taken, though thy appellants re-
quested the opportunity to present addition-
al evidence to the director.	 -
A number of errors are assigned by ap-
pellants. Before we turn to those matters,
however, it is necessary that we first ad-
dress a threshold question, not required to
be addreesed by us in Little Blue I, concern-
ing the significance of the provisions of
Neb.ltev.Stat §§ 87-490 to 87-488 (Reissue
1978) and cited as The Nongame and En-
dangered Species Conservation Act (Act).
Unless we determine that the Act has no
application to the instant project or, if ap-
need not address any of the other errors
assigned.
In 1973 the Congress of the United States
enacted the Endangered Species Act of
1978. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1976 &
Supp. 111 1979). Under the provisions of
the federal Endangered Species Act, states
were required to peas similar endangered
species legislation in order to continue re-
ceiving certain federal funds. As a result,
in 1975 the Nebraska Legislature adopted
the above-cited Act 1975 Neb.Laws, LB.
145.
The purpose of the Act is spelled out in
§ 37-432, which provides in part: "The
Legislature finds and declares: ... (2) That
species of wildlife and wild plants normally
occurring within this state which may be
found to be threatened or endangered with-
in this state- shall be accorded such protec-
tion as is necessary to maintain and en-
hance their numbers." The pertinent por-
tion of the Act, which is found in § 87-
435(8), reads as follows: "The Governor
shall review other programs administered
by him and utilize such programs in fur-
therance of the purposes of sections 87-430
to 37-438. All other state departments and
agencies shall, in consultation with and
with the assistance of the commission, uti-
lize their authorities in furtherance of the
purposes of sections 87-480 to 27-438 by
carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species and threatened spe-
cies listed pursuant to section 37-434, and
by taking  such action necessary to insure
that actions authonsed, funded, CC carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered or threatened
species or result in the destruction or modi-
fication of habitat of such species which is
determined by the COMITISIOD to be crit-
ical." (Emphasis supplied.) The commis-
sion referred to in the Act is defined by
statute as the Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission. See §87-431(2). Pursuant
to the federal Endangered Species Act and
the state Act, certain species have been
declared to be endangered species, including
the whooping crane and the bald eagle,
both of whom either roost upon or in some
manna use the Platte River area as a habi-
tat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980); Neb. Game
and Parks Comm. Wildlife Reg. 9-4(a)
(1981). There may be others.
The Act imposes two obligations on all
state departments and agencies. One is
that all state departments and agencies
must, after consulting with Game and
Parks, carry out programs for the conserva-
tion of endangered species, and (2) all state
departments and agencies must net take
any action that will result in jeopardizing
the continued existence of endangered or
threatened species or result ip the destruc-
tion or modification of a habitat of such
species. § 37-435(3).
[1,2] There is no question but that the
Department of Water Resources is a de-
partment or agency within the meaning of
§ 37-435(3). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-705 (Reis-
sue 1978). Furthermore, Little Blue, as a
creature of statute and a political subdivi-
sion, is also an agency within the meaning
of § 37-485(3) and bound by its provisions.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 2-3213(1) (Cum.Supp.
1980). Schlientz v. City of North Platte,
172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 68 (1961); Vap v.
City of McCook, 178 Neb. 844, 136 N.W.2d
220 (1965); Seward County Rural Fire Pro-
tection Dist. v. County of Seward, 156 Neb.
516, 56 N.W2d 700 (1953). Likewise, it
seems clear beyond question that the devel-
opment of the irrigation project by Little
Blue and the issuance of a permit by the
Department to Little Blue both qualify as
"action" taken by a state agency and, there-
fore, may not jeopardize the continued ex-
istence of the endangered species or result
in the destruction or modification of their
habitat.
[3] The director, in his order issued fol-
lowing our remand in Little Blue I, found,
among other matters: "The potential af-
fects [sic] to [fish and wildlife habitat] ei-
ther are deemed minimal or would be miti-
gated by offsetting or even enhancing cir-
cumstances derived from operation of the.
proposed project" (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither the meaning of that finding in light
of the restrictions of the Act nor the basis
for that finding and the director's attempt
to balance interests is made clear from the
order. Nor can one determine what the
• effect of this project will be on the habitat
of the endangered species involved by ex-
amining the voluminous record in this case.
We are simply unable to determine from
the record in its present state whether the
proposed project will in fact jeopardize the
continued existence of such endangered or
threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or modification of habitat of such spe-
cies, contrary to the prohibitions contained
in § 37-435(3). There is some evidence in
the record to indicate that the habitats may
be affected by the project The extent of
that effect and how it applies when exam-
ined in light of the Act is not shown so that
we can determine if the Act is being violat-
ed. What is clear, however, is that the
examination that has been made by both
the Department and Little Blue is inade-
quate, and further evidence is required.
We should note at this point that the
provisions of the Act may not repeal the
provisions of Neb.Const art. XV, §§ 4, 5,
and 6. To the extent that the prohibition
contained in the Act denied to a citizen of
the State of Nebraska a right otherwise
guaranteed to the citizen, the Act would
have to give way. That issue is not before
us at this time and we do not consider what
conflicts between the Act and the Constitu-
tion of Nebraska may arise. Absent a con-
stitutional conflict, however, the require-
ments imposed upon a state agency by the
Act, as presently enacted, are rather clear
and may not be either ignored or waived.
The relevant section of the state Act is,
for all practical purposes, identical with the
federal act on the same 'subject, and there-
fore the decisions of the federal courts,
including the U. S. Supreme Court, in inter-
preting the federal act are of great help to
us in deciding this case. The U. S. Supreme
Court in its decision in TVA v. Hill, 487
U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2179, 57 L.E42d 117
(1978), put to rest any doubt as to how the
act is to be applied. The issue in the WA
case was whether the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority could complete the construction of
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the tSlico Dam on 'the Little Tennessee
River once it was determined that the ait-
buil habitat of the snail darter would be
totally eliminated by completion of the
dam. At the time that the snail darter's
existence near the Smite was first deter-
mined, millions of dollars had already been
spent on the dam's construction, which WM
nearly completed. In enjoining the comple-
tion of the dam, the .U. S. Supreme Court
said at 17$: "One would be hard pressed to
finds statutory provision whose terms were
any plainer than those in 47 of the Endan-
gered Species Act Its very words affirms-
tively command all -federal agencies 'to in-
ewe that actions authorised, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardise the
continued existence' of an endangered spe-
cies or 'result in the destruction or modifi-
cation of habitat of such species ....' 16
U.S.C. 6 1586 (1976 ed.). (Emphasis add-
ed.) This language admits of no excep-
tion." Section 7 of the federal act is almost
identical with § 37-435(3) of the state Act
The U. S. Supreme Court concluded that
the history of the act dearly required the
courts to follow the mandates of the legisla-
tion, regardless of what the courts might
think. The Court said at 179-80, 98 &Ct. at
2294: "In shaping legislation to deal with
the problem thus presented, Congress start-
ed from the finding that '[t]he two major
causes of extinction are hunting and de-
struction of natural habitat' S.Rep.No.93-
807, p. 2 (1973). Of these twin threats,
Congress was informed that the greatest
was destruction of natural habitats; see
1973 House Hearings 286 (statement of As-
sociate Deputy Chief for National Forest
System, Dept of Agriculture); id., at 241
(statement of Director of Mich. Dept of
Natural Resources); id, at 906 (statement
of Stephen R. Seater, Defenders of Wild-
life); lechenmeier, The Endangered Spa-
des Act of 1973: Preservation or Pandemo-
nium?, -5 Environ. Law 29, 31 (1974). Wit-
nesse, recommended, among other things,
that -Congress require all land-managing
*geodes 'to avoid damaging critical habitat
for endangered species and to take -positive
steps to improve such habitat.' 1973 House
Hearings 261 (statement of Director cif
Nit Dept of Natural Resources). Virtu-
illy every bill Introduced in Congress dur-
ing the 1973 session responded to this con,
corn by incorporating language similar, if
not identical, to that found in the present
§ '7 of the Act nose provisions were de-
signed, in the words of an administration
witness, 'for the first time [to] prohibit [a]
--federal agency from taking action which
does jeopardize the status of endangered
species,' Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983
before the Subcommittee on Environment
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sees., 68 (1973) (statement of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interibr)
(emphasis added); furthermore, the me-
posed bills would 'dimwit) all ... Federal
agencies to utilize their authorities for
carrying out programs for the protection of
endangered animals.' 1973 House Hearings
205 (statement of Assistant Secretary of
the Interior). (Emphasis added.)
"As it was finally passed, the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 represented the most
comprehensive legislation for the preserva-
tion of endangered species ever enacted by
any nation. Its stated purposes were 'to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved,' and
'to provide a program for the conservation
of such	 . species ...	 16 USX.
§ 1531(3) (1976 ed.). In furtherance of
these goals, Congress expressly stated in
§ 2(c) that 'all Federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species ....' 16
U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1976 ed.). (Emphasis add-
ed.) List there be any ambiguity as to the
meaning of this statutory directive, the Act
specifically defined 'conserve' as meaning
'to we and the use of all methods sad
procedures which are necessary to king
any endangered species or threatens(' mo-
des to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary.'"
17*--U. S. Supreme Court went on to
make further comment Concerning the sew
Der in *bill the set is to be etielialeeered,
say* et 128-84, 8.0t. at Slit "While
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the Conference Report made no specific ref-
erence to this choice of provisions, the
House manager of the bill, Representative
Dingell, provided an interpretation of what
the Conference bill would require, making
it clear that the mandatory provisions of
§ 7 were not casually or inadvertently in-
cluded:
'[Section 7] substantially amplifie[s] the
obligation of [federal agencies] to take
steps within their power to carry out the
purposes of this act A recent article ...
illustrates the problem which might occur
absent this new language in the bill. It
appears that the whooping cranes of this
country, perhaps the best known of our
endangered species, are being threatened by
Air Force bombing activities along the gulf
coast of Texas. Under existing law, the
Secretary of Defense has some discretion as
to whether or not he will take the neassavry
action to see that this threat disappears
. . [O]nce the bill is enacted, [the Satre-
tary of Defense] would be required to take
the proper steps. . .
"'. . . [T]he agencies of Government can
no longer plead that they can do nothing
about it. They can, and they must. The
law is clear.'"
In recognizing that the Court was re-
quired to follow the dictates of the legisla-
tion and not view the matter as merely de
minimis, the U. S. Supreme Court said at
187-88: "One might dispute the applicabili-
ty of these examples to the Tellico Dam by
saying that in this case the burden on the
public through the loss of millions of unre-
coverable dollars would greatly outweigh
the loss of the snail darter. But neither the
Endangered Species Act nor Art. III of the
Constitution provides federal courts with
authority to make such fine utilitarian cal-
culations. On the contrary, the plain lan-
guage of the Act, buttressed by its legisla-
tive history, shows clearly that Congress
viewed the value of endangered species as
'incalculable.' Quite obviously, it would be
difficult for a court to balance the loss of a
sum certain—even $100 million—against a
congressionally declared 'incalculable' value,
even assuming we had the power to engage
In such a weighing process, which we em-
phatically do not"
Just as the U. S. Supreme Court was
without choice when examining the effect
of the federal Endangered Species Act and
balancing it against the benefits of the
nearly completed Tellico Dam, likewise, this
court is without choice, in examining the
effect of the state Act, to engage in such
balancing. The requirements of the Act
are absolute and must be met. That there
may be offsetting or even enhancing cir-
cumstances derived from the operation of
the project may be insufficient if the en-
dangered species habitat is destroyed, as
the Act now stands.
[4] No action of a state department or
agency nor program administered by the
Governor can be permitted as long as
§ 37-435(3) is in effect until the interested
parties have consulted with Game and
Parks and have determined that the action
contemplated will not jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of such endangered species or
result in destruction or modification of hab-
itat of such species.
We pause at this point to clearly point
out that we do not, by our action today,
determine that the project does indeed vio-
late the Act We merely decide as we do
because the record before us fails to disclose
that the Department and Little Blue ade-
quately consulted with and sought the as-
sistance of Game and Parks in planning the
project, and for the further reason that the
record before UB fails to disclose that the
actions contemplated by both Little Blue, in
constructing its projeet, and the Depart-
ment, in authorizing the project, will not
"jeopardize the continued existence of such
endangered or threatened species or result
in the destruction or modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the
commission to be critical." Until the record
contains sufficient evidence upon which
such determination can be made, in the first
instance by the director, and if necessary on
appeal by this court, the project must be
halted and the cause remanded for further
proceedings.
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[5] In view of our action herein, we
believe it advisable to comment on what is
meant when the Act requires the parties to
"consult" with the commission. The consul-
tation required by the Act does not grant to
Caine and Parks absolute veto. In National
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976), the court said:
"Federal agencies are required to consult
and obtain the assistance of the Secretary
before taking any actions which may affect
endangered species or critical habitat.
However, once an agency has had meaning-
ful consultation with the Secretary of Inte-
rior concerning actions which may affect an
endangered species the final decision of
whether or not to proceed with the action
lies with the agency itself. Section 7 does
not give the Department of Interior a veto
over the actions of other federal agencies,
provided that the required consultation has
occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) See, also,
Sierra Club v. Frothlice, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th
Cir. 1976).
While Game and Parks, therefore, does
not have absolute veto, it is clear from the
Act that meaningful consultation is an ab-
solute prerequisite to proceeding with any
project. Moreover, because the commission
does not have power of veto does not mean
that either the Department or Little Blue
can ignore the effect of the project on the
endangered species if in fact the evidence
supports that conclusion.
IA National Wildlife Federation v. Cole-
man, supra at 373, the court further noted:
"In holding that the appellees have 'ade-
quately considered' the effects of the high-
way on the crane, the district court miscon-
strued the dinsctive of § 7. As we have
pointed out, § 7 imposes on all federal
agencies the mandatory obligation to insure
that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by them does not jeopardize the
existence of an endangered species or de-
stroy critical habitat of such species ....
Although the FEIS and the administrative
record indicates that the appellees have rec-
ognized and considered the danger the high-
way poses to the crane, they have failed to
take the necessary steps 'to insure' that the
highway will not jeopardize the crane or
—
modify its habitat" The court therefore
enjoined the project and directed that the
Department of Interior take a closer look at
what effect, if any, construction of a high-
way upon the habitat of the crane would
have.
The court further noted in Coleman that
if the agency disregarded the evidence, the
court would be required to review the mat-
ter, saying at 371-72: "It follows that after
consulting with the Secretary the federal
agency involved must determine whether it
has taken all necessary action to insure that
its actions will not jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered species or de-
stroy or modify habitat critical to the exist-
ence of the species. Once that decision is
made it is then subject to judicial review to
ascertain whether 'the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.' Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. [402] at
416, 91 S.Ct [814] at 824, 23 L.Ed.2d [136]
at 153. See Title 16, U.S.C., Section
1540(X)."
In view of the fact that we are remand-
ing this matter back to the director for
further proceedings, we deem it appropriate
to comment on one further matter. Since
our decision in Little Blue I, the Legislature
of the State of Nebraska has amended the
provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat §§ 46-204, 46-
206, 46-234, and 46-235 (Supp.1981), all re-
lating to transbasin diversion. 1981 Neb.
Laws, LB. 252. In particular, the Legisla-
ture has amended § 46-235 to provide that
certain criteria are to be considered by the
director in determining whether the public
interest as required by the Constitution is
met. Neb.Const art. XV, § 6.
[6] The substantive right to divert the
water unless the public interest demands
otherwise is found in the Constitution and
cannot be denied by statute. Neb.Const
art. XV, § 6; Little Blue N.RD. v. Lower
Platte North N.RD., 206 Neb. 535, 294
N.W2d 598 (1980). The function of Neb.
Rev.Stat § 46-289 (Supp.1981) is to estab-
lish in part the procedure to be followed by
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the director in attempting to determine
whether a denial of the application is de-
manded by the public interest. As such,
§ 46-289 is a procedural law and not a
substantive law, and is to be applied to
hearingit held after the passage of the Act
even though the application was filed prior
to the passage of the procedural law. • See,
Romano v. B. B. Greenberg Co., 108 R.I.
182, 273 A.2d $15 (1971); Schultz v. Gomel-
ink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W2d 484 (1967).
[7] In 2 AmaTur2d Administrative Lam
6 826 at 149 (1962), it provides in part: "An
administrative agency is required to act un-
der the law as it stands when its order is
entered. A change of law pending an ad-
ministrative determination must be fol-
lowed and the new law applied, at least in
relation to permits for the doing of future
acts, unless the statute contains a saving
clause."
And in Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mer-
cy Hospital, 191 Neb. 224, 236,214 N.W2d
490, 492 (1974), we said: "[A]mendments to
statutes which ire procedural in nature are
applicable to pending cases which have not
been tried." See, also, Ziffrin, Inc. v. Unit-
ed States, 318 U.S. 73,68 S.Ct. 465,87 L.Ed.
621 (1943).
We believe that, upon remand, further
hearings should be held by the director and
relevant evidence should be adduced Sat-
ing particularly to those factors set forth in
§ 46-285 as now amended, as well as the
project's effect upon the endangered spe-
cies. In so holding we do not pass upon the
validity of § 46-285. -
The action of the director is therefore
reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS.
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